The New Geometry of Power

BRICS+, NATO and Emerging Partner Networks

BRICS and BRICS+ Expansion

At the Johannesburg summit in August 2023 the BRICS leaders decided to admit Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as full members; Indonesia accepted its invitation and formally joined on 6 January 2025. The bloc thus grew from five members in 2020 to eleven in 2025. At their 16th summit in Kazan in August 2024, leaders created a “partner country” status. The Russian presidency subsequently announced that Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda and Uzbekistan would join as partners on 1 January 2025, with Nigeria and Vietnam following soon after.

This expansion reflects a desire among Global South countries to forge alternatives to Western-led institutions. However, BRICS remains a loose coordination forum rather than a treaty organisation; it lacks a budget or permanent secretariat. The group’s economic ambitions are nonetheless significant. UNCTAD estimates that intra-BRICS merchandise trade expanded more than thirteen-fold since 2003, reaching US$1.17 trillion in 2024. Brazil, Russia and Indonesia rely on BRICS markets for over 30% of their exports, while Iran, Ethiopia, Russia and India source more than 40% of their imports from fellow members.

Yet the bloc’s trade potential is under-utilised: despite accounting for over two-thirds of the Global South’s GDP, intra-BRICS trade constitutes only about 20% of South–South trade. Structural barriers—including regulatory divergence and infrastructure gaps—continue to limit deeper integration.

Quantifying the New Flows

US–China Trade Decoupling

The United States remains China’s largest single-country trading partner, yet bilateral goods trade has been declining. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, US goods exports to China fell to US$106.3 billion in 2025 while imports dropped to US$308.4 billion, leaving a trade deficit of US$202.1 billion. That deficit narrowed by US$93.4 billion compared with 2024 because imports fell by US$130.4 billion, reflecting tariffs, supply-chain re-shoring and weak Chinese demand.

China’s global trade remains massive; its customs administration reported 2025 exports of US$3.77 trillion and imports of US$2.58 trillion, yielding a record trade surplus of US$1.19 trillion. The growing surplus underscores China’s dependence on external markets while domestic consumption remains tepid.

Tariff volatility is reshaping investment decisions. The US intends to introduce a “fast-track” pilot programme to facilitate investment from allied countries, but investors must avoid partnering with “foreign adversaries” and may be required to terminate certain commercial relationships. Proposed rules also aim to extend CFIUS jurisdiction to greenfield investments and increase restrictions on Chinese investments.

Evolving Enforcement Priorities

Designations and Geographic Focus

Sanctions are no longer targeted exclusively at rogue states; they are increasingly used as tools of geoeconomic competition. The Center for a New American Security’s 2025 sanctions year-in-review reports that 1,764 persons were added to the US Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List during 2025: 442 of these designations were issued by the outgoing Biden administration and 1,322 by the incoming Trump administration. An additional 183 entities were placed on the Commerce Department’s Entity List.

Trump administration designations targeted facilitators of Iran’s nuclear and regional activities, terrorism and transnational crime, and Chinese, Mexican and Iranian persons collectively comprised about 39% of all US designations. Russia-related designations decreased markedly as diplomatic efforts sought to maintain channels for potential negotiations.

Castellum AI’s 2024 review showed that the United States issued more sanctions than all other major sanctioning countries combined, with crypto-related designations surging from 256 digital wallet addresses in 2021 to 967 in 2024 and China experiencing a 96% increase in designations. Russia remained the largest sanctions target, with about four times as many designations as the rest of the top ten combined.

Toward Comprehensive Economic Security

European Union

The EU’s Fifth Annual Report on FDI screening shows that member states reviewed 3,136 transactions in 2024. 41% were subject to formal screening, while 59% were exempt or deemed ineligible. Excluding Sweden—whose new FDI Act generates many irrelevant notifications—the share of cases requiring formal screening climbs to 67%. Of the transactions formally screened, 86% were cleared unconditionally, 9% were approved with conditions, 4% were withdrawn and 1% were prohibited. The total number of cases subject to formal screening has nearly quadrupled since 2020 (from 362 to 1,286), reflecting the proliferation of national regimes. Manufacturing is the most frequently screened sector, accounting for 50% of Phase 2 reviews.

The EU is working on a revised FDI regulation that will make national screening mechanisms mandatory in all member states and extend coverage to intra-EU investments where the EU investor is ultimately controlled by a third-country person. It will introduce a common minimum scope (dual-use/military goods, advanced technologies, critical raw materials, critical infrastructure) and enhance cooperation among national authorities.

United States – CFIUS

The US Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reviewed 116 declarations in 2024 (up from 109 in 2023) and 209 full notices (down from 233 in 2023). Only 9% of covered transaction notices required mitigation, a sharp drop from 21% in 2023. CFIUS escalated two transactions to the President in 2024; both were divestment orders targeting Chinese investors in sensitive sectors. The committee assessed four penalties for breaches of mitigation agreements and one penalty for misstatements.

Implications for Cross-Border Transactions

Deal Structuring in a Multipolar Risk Landscape

The expansion of BRICS+ and the diversification of partner networks suggest that more transactions will involve entities from jurisdictions outside the traditional G7/NATO sphere. Firms should anticipate:

Regulatory divergence. BRICS members lack a unified trade policy; regulatory frameworks vary widely. Due diligence must account for inconsistent contract enforcement, data-privacy rules and local content requirements. In Europe and North America, harmonisation around national-security screening means investors face a converging set of triggers (critical technologies, critical infrastructure, sensitive data).

Currency and payment risks. Expanded BRICS membership increases the share of global trade conducted in non-Western currencies. Companies must prepare for settlements in yuan, dirham, riyal or local currencies and manage exposure to currency controls. The proliferation of CBDCs and BRICS de-dollarisation initiatives could complicate treasury operations.

Preparing for Multi-Jurisdictional FDI Review

Strategic Foresight in an Era of Bloc Politics

The new geometry of power is defined by overlapping alliance networks, economic de-risking and the weaponisation of finance. The BRICS+ expansion has created a South–South bloc that commands over one-quarter of global GDP and fosters alternative trade corridors, yet its internal heterogeneity and infrastructure gaps mean that integration will be gradual. NATO’s enlargement and new defence spending commitments anchor Western security, while US–China competition shapes the technology and investment rules of the game. Sanctions and foreign-investment screening regimes are proliferating and converging across the United States, EU, UK and Canada, signalling that economic security is national security.

For companies with China/Asia exposure, this multipolar landscape requires continuous risk mapping. Transaction planning must incorporate not just conventional financial metrics but also the geopolitical alignment of counterparties, the strategic sensitivity of technologies and the evolving regulatory regimes across multiple jurisdictions. Building mitigation-ready structures, maintaining dynamic compliance programmes and diversifying supply chains across blocs will be essential to navigate the cross-border risk landscape of 2026 and beyond.